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l'anima filosofante non solamente contempla essa veritade,  
ma ancora contempla lo suo contemplare medesimo e la bellezza di quello,  
rivolgendosi sovra se stessa e di se stessa innamorando  
per la bellezza del suo primo guardare.  
 (Dante, Convivio 4 II 18) 
In this article I will begin by discussing recent criticism, by Mauro Antonelli and Werner Sauer. of  
the ontological interpretation of  Franz Brentano’s concept of  intentionality, as formulated by i.a. 
Roderick Chisholm. I will then outline some apparent inconsistencies of  the positions advocated by 
Antonelli and Sauer with Brentano’s formulations of  his theory in several works and lectures. This 
new evaluation of  (unpublished) sources will then lead to a sketch of  a new approach to Brentano’s 
theory of  intentionality. Specifically, it will be argued that the notion of  “intentional object” is inher-
ently and unavoidably ambiguous in every act of  external perception, due to the fact that we can 
only have improper intentions directed at the external world. 
The ontological interpretation and its discontents 
In several articles Mauro Antonelli and Werner Sauer have advanced a systematical criticism of  the 
so-called ontological interpretation of  Franz Brentano’s concept of  intentionality (e.g. Antonelli 
2000, Sauer 2006). Antonelli and Sauer claim that this interpretation, as proposed mainly by Rode-
rick Chisholm, Oskar Kraus, and more recently Barry Smith, represents a severe misunderstanding 
of  Brentano’s thought. 
According to the ontological interpretation, the intentionality of  consciousness does not consist in a special 
relation, that is to say, in the “intentional relation” to ordinary objects, but in an ordinary relation to a special 
class of  objects, the “intentional” or “immanent objects”.  (Antonelli 2000, p. 98) 1
What makes acts intentional, would be their having an intentional object. The intentional relation 
can never fail, whatever the status of  the external object, because there always is an immanent ob-
ject: a special object with a special existential status.  
 “Nach der ontologischen Deutung besteht also die lntentionalität des Bewußtseins nicht in einer besonderen Bezie1 -
hung, d.h. in der “intentionalen Beziehung” zu gewöhnlichen Objekten, sondern in einer gewöhnlichen Beziehung zu 
einer besonderen Klasse von Gegenständen, den “intentionalen” bzw. “immanenten Gegenständen”.
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When Hans thinks of  a horse, then the horse must immanently inexist in Hans’ mind. In the middle Brentano, 
this does not mean anything less than that Hans is in a logically regular relation to an immanent horse.  2
(Chrudzimski 2004, pp. 124 f.)  3
According to Chrudzimski, in Brentano’s middle period his position regarding the immanent object 
is in most respects an object theory rather than a mediator theory. The object of  the intentional rela-
tion would be a special entity that in a certain sense acts as surrogate for the commonsensical inten-
ded objects. After all, we must always have an intentional, i.e. immanent, object, both when the ex-
ternal object exists and when it does not. As Chrudzimski points out, in principle such an object 
theory does not imply anything yet about the ontological status of  such intentional objects (Chrud-
zimski 2004, pp. 125, compare Chrudzimski 2007, p. 6.) Chisholm, however, famously argued that 
this would entail a special kind of  existence “short of  actuality but more than nothingness”.  4
Against such interpretations of  Brentano’s theory of  intentionality, Antonelli and Sauer quote the 
master himself, who apparently protested vehemently against such distortions of  his doctrine when 
they were advanced during his lifetime. The central quotation they bring to bear against the ontolo-
gical interpretation and the object-theory comes from a letter of  Brentano to Anton Marty of  
17-03-1905: 
However, it has never been my view that it would be the case that the immanent object = “presented object”. 
The presentation does not have “presented thing”, but “the thing”, so e.g. the presentation of  a horse not 
“presented horse”, but “horse” as (immanent, i.e. the only kind of  object in the proper sense) object.  5
Brentano goes on to clarify that this would mean to equate in all respects the objects of  the first and 
of  the second intention: the object of  e.g. external perception and the object of  internal perception. 
The “presented horse” is the (partial) object of  the internal perception, while the object of  the ex-
ternal perception would simply be the horse itself. However, the latter claim must be made with gre-
at caution: to be the object of  any act means, as Brentano himself  says in the letter, to be an imma-
nent object. So the distinction here is not actually between external and internal object, but between 
intentional object and intentional correlate. Antonelli clarifies: 
In the Psychology from an empirical Standpoint Brentano thematized the psychical act, in so far as this is primarily 
directed at its intentional or immanent object; the act is directed at itself  as secondary object merely on the 
 “Wenn Hans an ein Pferd denkt, dann muß das Pferd im Geist von Hans immanent inexistieren. Das bedeutet jedoch 2
nach dem mittleren Brentano nichts weniger, als daß Hans in einer logisch regulären Relation zu einem immanenten 
Pferd steht.”
 Compare Chrudzimski 2007, p 19: “a wholly regular relation to a special object” “eine ganz reguläre Relation zu einem 3
speziellen Objekt”.
 The same kind of  (mis)interpretation of  intentionality as an object-theory is also well-known in Husserl-scholarship, 4
where it is described in the same terms, cf. Smith & McIntyre 1982, p. 41: “the intentionality of  an act does not consist 
in a peculiar sort of  “intentional relation” to an ordinary object, but in an ordinary relation to a peculiar sort of  “inten-
tional object”.”
 “Es ist aber nicht meine Meinung gewesen, daß das immanente Objekt = „vorgestelltes Objekt" sei. Die Vorstellung 5
hat nicht „vorgestelltes Ding", sondern „das Ding", also z.B. die Vorstellung eines Pferdes nicht „vorgestelltes Pferd", 
sondern „Pferd" zum (immanenten, d.h. allein eigentlich Objekt zu nennenden) Objekt.” Compare with the translation 
in Brentano 2009, 52.
Carlo Ierna “Improper Intentions of  ambiguous objects” Final accepted draft -    3
side. In this secondary relation the intentional correlate, that is the thought as such, of  the act is thought toge-
ther with it. This intentional correlate, that begins and ends with the act, is the psychically modified counterpart 
of  the intentional object, which is independent from thought. 
In the Descriptive Psychology, Brentano now thematizes the psychical act in its inner configuration, i.e. in so far as 
it grasps itself  with direct evidence in inner perception, where the intentional correlate as “part of  the intentio-
nal pair of  correlates” is always also grasped together with it. In contrast to the intentional correlate, that is a 
distinctional part in the proper sense, he now considers the intentional object as distinctional part in a modified 
sense or as “part to be obtained by modifying distinction”.  (Antonelli 2000, p. 109.)  6
Some difficulties 
There are some issues with such a position. First of  all, in Brentano’s logic lectures of  1884/85 (just 
a few years before the descriptive psychology lectures of  1887/1888) we find the correlate and the 
intentional object straightforwardly equated: 
Let us now turn to the analysis of  the elements of  our internal perceptual presentation, as far as we can con-
duct it. Its object is our Self  in ist real manifold psychical references to intentional correlatives (immanent ob-
jects).  (Brentano EL 72, 12287) 7
… 
First, regarding the [act of] presenting. 
Its correlative [is] the presented. Both [are] called presentation. (Which cannot be changed, though it frequently 
leads to confusions between the act of  presentation and the presented (intentional object)).  (Brentano EL 72, 8
12289) 
As I will argue more extensively below, I do not think that Antonelli can be right when he claims 
that the “intentional object” is completely “independent from thought”. It is precisely as intentional 
that the object appears to us in reflection, as phenomenal, i.e. as part of  a mental act. An intentional 
object as mental object cannot at the same time and in the same sense be something in itself  extra-
mentally.  9
 “In der Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt hatte Brentano den psychischen Akt thematisiert, insofern dieser primär 6
auf  sein intentionales bzw. immanentes Objekt gerichtet ist; lediglich nebenbei […] ist der Akt auf  sich selbst als sekun-
däres Objekt gerichtet. In dieser sekundären Beziehung wird mit dem Akt selbst sein intentionales Korrelat, d.h. das 
Gedachte als solches, mitgedacht. Dieses intentionale Korrelat, das mit dem Akt mitentsteht und mitvergeht, ist das psy-
chisch modifizierte Gegenstück zum intentionalen Gegenstand, der vom Denken unabhängig ist. 
In der Deskriptiven Psychologie thematisiert Brentano nun den psychischen Akt in seiner inneren Bezüglichkeit, d.h. inso-
fern er sich selbst in der inneren Wahrnehmung mit unmittelbarer Evidenz erfaßt, wobei das intentionale Korrelat als 
„Teil des intentionalen Korrelatenpaares" stets miterfaßt wird. Im Unterschied zum intentionalen Korrelat, das distink-
tioneller Teil im eigentlichen Sinne ist, betrachtet er nun das intentionale Objekt als distinktionellen Teil im modifizie-
renden Sinne bzw. als „durch modifizierende Distinktion zu gewinnenden Teil”.
 “Wenden wir uns nun zur Analyse der Elemente unserer inneren Wahrnehmungsvorstellung, so weit wie sie eben füh7 -
ren können. Ihr Objekt ist unser Selbst in seinem wirklichen mannigfachen psychischen Beziehungen mit intentionalen 
Korrelativen (immanenten Gegenständen).” Also see Chrudzimski (2004, p 155, n. 150).
 “Zunächst von dem Vorstellen. 8
Sein Korrelativ das Vorgestellte. Beides Vorstellung genannt. (Was nicht zu ändern, obwohl es häufig zu Verwechslungen 
führte zwischen Vorstellungsakt und Vorgestelltem (intentionalem Objekt)).”
 As I argue in Ierna 2012, 2014, and below, in the strict and proper sense, externally and independently from thought 9
there are only “unpresentable forces”, which per definition cannot be either the intentional or the intended object.
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Antonelli underscores that there are no multiple ways of  existing for Brentano, one cannot speak of  
“intentional existence” and “real existence” as different ontological levels:  
“To exist” accordingly means simply “to be correctly acknowledged”. Since there are no different ways of  ack-
nowledging, there can be no different ways of  existing.  (Antonelli 2000, p. 106) 10
However, I think that this does lead to some friction with his later claim that: 
The real A of  course exists independently from its being thought, while the thought A only exists in so far as 
one thinks the real A. The intentional or immanent object of  thought is not the thought, but the real A. . 11
(Antonelli 2000, p. 107) 
If  to exist means to be the object of  a positive judgement, then how can we speak of  something 
existing completely independently from any judgements whatsoever? If  we take the case of  external 
perception, Brentano warns time and again that “Wahrnehmung ist Falschnehmung”,  because the exis12 -
tence of  the external world is merely putative, hypothetical. The external world as such is unknowa-
ble in itself, it merely causes appearances in us. It would be odd, however, to say that the immanent 
objects cause appearances in us, they rather are the effects, the phenomena. Let us look at this in 
more detail.  
Brentano’s intentionality 
In nearly every discussion regarding Franz Brentano’s re-introduction of  the concept of  intentionali-
ty sooner or later the (in)famous passage from the Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte gets quoted 
to prove one point or another.  
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of  the Middle Ages called the intentional 
(or mental) inexistence of  an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a 
content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent 
objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so 
in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love 
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. 
This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of  mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhi-
bits anything like it. We could, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena 
which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (Brentano, 1874, pp. 124 f.; 1995, p. 88 f.) 
 “Existieren” heißt dementsprechend lediglich „als richtig anerkennen". Da es keine verschiedenen Weisen des Aner10 -
kennens gibt, kann es keine verschiedenen Weisen des Existierens geben.
 “Das wirkliche A existiert natürlich unabhängig von seinem Gedachtwerden, während das gedachte A nur insofern 11
existiert, als man an das wirkliche A denkt. Der intentionale bzw. immanente Gegenstand des Denkens ist nicht das ge-
dachte, sondern das wirkliche A”.
 Brentano (1874, p. 119): “Die innere Wahrnehmung [...] ist eigentlich die einzige Wahrnehmung im eigentlichen Sinne 12
des Wortes. [...] Die sogenannte äussere Wahrnehmung ist also strenggenommen nicht eine Wahrnehmung”.
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Unfortunately, there are numerous problems with both this practice as well as with the passage 
itself.  First of  all, it invariably gets quoted in a variety of  translations, secondly Brentano’s students 13
rarely refer to it, thirdly Brentano himself  in the actual quote admits that the terminology is neither 
wholly his own nor wholly unambiguous. Indeed, in this quote  we actually find at least six different 14
formulations of  the defining characteristic of  intentionality: 
1. Intentional inexistence 
2. Reference to a content 
3. Direction towards an object 
4. Immanent objectivity 
5. Including something as object 
6. Intentionally containing an object 
Due to the problematic nature of  the intentionality quote, we should try to contextualize these va-
rious descriptions by drawing on other passages from Brentano’s writings too. In this respect, it 
seems useful to me to sketch a brief  counterfactual scenario here: what if  the intentionality quote 
wouldn’t exist? Which sources would we turn to in order to discuss the thorny issue of  intentionality 
and intentional objects? As has already been often remarked, Brentano’s influence is for the most 
part due to his lectures and letters, rather than to his publications,  hence in the counterfactual sce15 -
nario these would of  course then be the most important sources to understand not only Brentano’s 
concept of  intentionality, but also the reception of  this concept among his students. The first ones 
to turn to, would be his mid-1880s lectures on logic: 
In every psychical phenomenon we find a reference to an immanent object. Examples may clarify this: when I 
think, I think of  something, something is as thought in me; the thought is the immanent object of  the thinking. 
When I want, I want something etc. It is the same with phenomena of  pleasure: enjoying something, fearing 
something. Always an immanent object, and if  you take away this object, then you take away the psychical 
phenomenon as well. This reference is an exclusive property of  psychical phenomena, something similar is 
missing in physical phenomena.  16
 On this point, I couldn’t agree more with Antonelli (2000, p. 93): “Brentano’s famous intentionality passage from the 13
Psychology from an empirical Standpoint is quoted over and over again, and his so-called “Intentionality Thesis” explained, 
and generally misunderstood.” “Immer wieder wird Brentanos berühmte Intentionalitätspassage aus der Psychologie vom 
empirischen Standpunkt zitiert und seine sogenannte “These der Intentionalität” ausgelegt und durchwegs mißverstanden”.
 And its footnotes, where he adds the aristotelian terminology of  “psychische Einwohnung”.14
 These are also considered among the reasons for “Brentano’s invisibility”, e.g. as outlined in Albertazzi et al. (1996, p. 15
4).
 Brentano Y 2, pp. 46 f. “In jedem psychischen Phänomen finden wir eine Beziehung auf  ein immanentes Objekt. 16
Beispiele mögen das erläutern: Wenn ich denke, so denke ich etwas, es ist etwas als Gedachtes in mir; das Gedachte ist 
der immanente Gegenstand des Denkens. Wenn ich will, will ich etwas usw. Auch bei den Phänomenen der Lust ist das-
selbe: Freude an etwas, Furcht vor etwas. Immer ein immanentes Objekt, und wenn Sie dies Objekt wegnehmen, so 
nehmen Sie das psychische Phänomen mit weg. Diese Beziehung ist den psychischen Phänomenen ausschließlich eigen, 
es fehlt etwas Derartiges bei den physischen Phänomenen”.
Carlo Ierna “Improper Intentions of  ambiguous objects” Final accepted draft -    6
Note that the term “intentional inexistence” does not make an appearance, it is actually relatively 
rare and its occurrence in the overused intentionality quote has distorted its importance.  Psychical 17
phenomena are those that have a “relation” or “reference” (“Beziehung”) to an immanent object: No 
immanent object, no mental act.  What is this “relation” (if  it is at all a relation)? What is this im18 -
manent object? In general when I think something, the immanent object is the “thought object”. 
There cannot be a thought object without thought and there cannot be a thought without a thought 
object. This makes them correlates: 
Let us consider internal perception, it shows us e.g. presentations - which are real; judging, love, hate - all real. 
But these are not without correlates: no presentation without a presented, no judging without a judgment. In-
deed, these correlates are what is observed directly in internal perception, while the presenting, judging, etc. 
which are real, are observed indirectly. When we take both correlates of  bigger and smaller, father and son, 
then I cannot present one without the other. It is the same with internal perception. The presented is presented 
“in recto”, the presenting “in obliquo”. This is the reason why it has been often claimed that we would not 
present the latter at all, but only the former as presented. The loved as loved, but not the loving. The loved 
would be in us as phenomenon, but we would not perceive the loving as presenting? That is of  course a clear 
contradiction.  19
In this lecture from the WS 1884/85, Brentano employs both terminologies, speaking of  a relation 
of  thought to an immanent thought object as well as of  the correlativity of  thought and the thought 
object.  
But we have to be careful to distinguish the two different perspectives. In the second quote, Brenta-
no tells us that from the perspective of  internal perception, we always see two correlative elements: 
the presenting and the presented, the judging and the judged, etc. Internal perception presents them 
both, one in recto one in obliquo, but it is not exclusively directed at the phenomenon itself, which is 
the target of  the primary act. From the perspective of  the primary act, we are not aware of  the im-
 Sauer 2006, p. 3: “Though Brentano himself  explicitly points out that he does not mean to propose the expression 17
“intentional (mental) inexistence” as his own technical terminology, commentators generally have concentrated precisely 
on this expression as the key for understanding the intentionality passage, indeed as key to the conception of  intentiona-
lity of  the pre-reistic Brentano in general.”, “Wiewohl Brentano selbst ausdrücklich klarstellt, daß er den Ausdruck ,in-
tentionale (mentale) Inexistenz‘ nicht als seinen eigenen terminus technicus verstanden wissen will, haben sich Kommen-
tatoren vielfach gerade auf  diesen Ausdruck als Schlüssel für das Verständnis der Intentionalitätspassage, ja der Intentio-
nalitätsauffassung des vorreistischen Brentano überhaupt konzentriert.”
 In Brentano’s own notes for this lecture, manuscript EL 72, 12093: “No presenting without presented”, “Kein Vorstel18 -
len ohne Vorgestelltes”.
 Brentano Y 2, pp. 104 f. “Nehmen wir die innere Wahrnehmung, sie zeigt uns z.B. Vorstellungen - das ist etwas Rea19 -
les; Urteil, Liebe und Haß - alles real. Aber diese sind nicht ohne Korrelate: kein Vorstellen ohne Vorgestelltes, kein Ur-
teilen ohne Geurteiltes. Ja, diese Korrelate sind dasjenige, was eigentlich direkt betrachtet wird bei der inneren Wahr-
nehmung, während das Vorstellen, Urteilen etc., also das Reale, indirekt betrachtet wird. Wenn wir die beiden Korrelate 
des Größeren und Kleineren, Vater und Sohn nehmen, so kann ich das eine nicht ohne das andere vorstellen. So geht es 
bei der inneren Wahrnehmung. Das Vorgestellte wird "in recto", das Vorstellen "in obliquo" vorgestellt. Daher ist auch 
oft behauptet worden, daß wir es gar nicht vorstellen, sondern nur das andere als Vorgestelltes. Das Geliebte als geliebt, 
das Lieben aber nicht. Das Geliebte sei als Phänomen in uns, wir nähmen aber das Lieben als Vorstellen nicht wahr? Das 
ist natürlich der reine Widerspruch.” 
In Brentano EL 72, 12144, he uses the same terminology of  correlates and directly presenting the correlative objects vs 
indirectly “in obliquo” presenting the acts.
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manent object as immanent. In perception we are aware of  the tree, not of  the tree-as-perceived. We 
can therefore still make a perspectival distinction between the correlative elements of  a psychical 
phenomenon and the immanent object of  the act. Moreover, in these passages nothing whatsoever 
is being said about “existence” or “inexistence”. Brentano discusses this in his lectures on descripti-
ve psychology:  20
17 /10 
As little as I am inclined to doubt the existence of  the outer world, yet we have no certainty about it. This is 
different with internal perception. That I now judge thus and so, etc. are innerly secured facts. Who would 
shake the existence of  this inner experience, would saw off  the branch he is sitting on.  21
21/10  
We need to understand the content of  sensations: inner experience does not show colors, tones, as existing in 
reality, but rather sensations of  them. It shows them as immanent objects, as phenomena. We have no right to 
consider the red, blue as really existing, but rather as really existing phenomena. Descriptive psychology must 
describe these as phenomena.  22
When introducing existence in the mix, things get complicated. Brentano, as a true empiricist, ack-
nowledges that external perception is not to be trusted. Internal perception, however, gives us indu-
bitable evidence. Yet, internal perception does not show us physical phenomena in the same way as 
external perception. It does not show us the objects of  sensation (colors, smells, sounds, etc.) as if  
they were properties of  some external substance, but rather, as Brentano literally claims in the quote 
I just gave,  it shows us the objects of  sensation “as immanent objects, as phenomena”. From the 23
perspective of  internal perception, the objects of  sensation are revealed to be correlates of  mental 
acts, and hence no less real than the acts themselves. However, while they are “really existing” as 
phenomena this does not imply that they are “really existing” externally as well, i.e. that to the im-
manent objects would correspond transcendent objects. 
17 /10  
Everything that we experience so evidently internally, shows a reference to an immanent object. I grasp in mys-
elf  a presenting, this is not without a presented, that is: without an immanent object, whether this is also avail-
 These quotations are taken from the manuscript Q 10 in the Husserl-Archives.20
 “So wenig ich geneigt bin an der Existenz der Außenwelt zu zweifeln, so haben wir doch keine Sicherheit über sie. 21
Anders die innere Erfahrung. Daß ich jetzt so und so urteile usw., sind innerlich gesicherte Tatsachen. Wer an der Exis-
tenz dieser inneren Erfahrung rüttelte, sägte den Ast ab, auf  dem er sitzt.”
 “Wir haben den Inhalt der Empfindungen kennen zu lernen: die innere Erfahrung zeigt nicht Farben, Töne als in 22
Wirklichkeit bestehend, wohl aber Empfindungen davon. Sie zeigt solche als immanente Gegenstände, als Phänomene. 
Wir haben kein Recht das Rot, Blau als wirklich bestehend anzusehen, wohl aber als Phänomene wirklich bestehend. 
Diese als Phänomene hat die deskriptive Psychologie zu beschreiben.”
 As well as in the letter to Marty from 17-03-1905 I quoted at the beginning, where Brentano states that the object of  23
the presentation of  a horse is an “immanent object”, which is “the only kind of  object in the proper sense”.
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able outside or not. What I want, exist in me, even if  it never becomes real outside. Always there is a loved, 
hated, assented, etc.  24
From the perspective of  internal perception we can distinguish two distinctional parts: the primary 
act and its correlate, which is the immanent object. Internal perception is not a separate act itself, 
but a secondary form of  consciousness, a secondary function within every mental act, indeed a re-
flection on the act.  Hence, also in each and every act of  external perception we are directed at one 25
and the same object, but from two perspectives: once as object of  external perception, and once as 
the object of  internal perception, i.e. as correlate of  the act of  external perception. Since internal 
perception shows us the act of  external perception and the object of  external perception as correla-
tes, we saw above that the object of  external perception is revealed as a phenomenon, as an imma-
nent object. As correlate, this immanent object cannot be any less real than the act in which it is in-
cluded, though this does not entitle us to any further conclusion, i.e. about its reality extra mentem. 
Indeed, as intentional object it cannot exist outside of  or independently from thought. Therefore, as 
objects of  internal perception, the correlates of  act and its immanent object both exist in the same 
sense. The parlance of  “as phenomena” is not a modification or weakening of  “existing”, since 
Brentano explicitly inserts “really” between them. To be a phenomenon is not a different or weaker 
mode of  existence, but rather a specific mode of  being perceived, i.e. by internal perception, which 
is the mental function of  perceiving psychical phenomena with their correlates.  26
In other lectures, Brentano seems to prefer the expression “relation to a content”, instead of  “relati-
on to an immanent object”, which he uses as equivalent: 
On the basic classes of  psychical phenomena 
1. All psychical phenomena have as common feature the relation to a content. That is what distinguishes them 
from all others. 
2. This relation to a content is a multiple one. According to the main differences, we can distinguish three main 
classes of  psychical phenomena: presenting (wheresoever something appears), judging (wheresoever something 
 “Alles, was wir so evident innerlich erfahren, zeigt eine Beziehung zu einem immanenten Objekt. Ich erfasse in mir ein 24
Vorstellen; dies ist nicht ohne ein Vorgestelltes, das ist: ohne ein immanentes Objekt da, sei dies nun draußen vorhanden 
der nicht. Was ich will, besteht in mir, wenn es auch draußen nie wirklich wird. Immer ist ein Geliebtes, Gehaßtes, Bejah-
tes usw. da.”
 “We also call inner perception with another name: reflection.” (Stumpf, Q 11/I, p. 16).25
 I take this to be the position Anton Marty is describing in his letter to Husserl of  17 VIII 1901: “Der Gegenstand der 26
Blauvorstellung ist: Blau, nicht: das vorgestellte Blau. Allein dies verträgt sich sehr wohl mit meiner These, daß jeder 
Vorstellung ein Correlat entspricht, welches nothwendig existirt, wenn die Vorstellung existirt. Denn damit ist nicht be-
hauptet, daß dieses Correlat als solches (also das vorgestellte Blau) Gegenstand meiner Vorstellung sei. Wenigstens gilt dies 
nicht, wenn es sich um den primären Bewußtseinsakt handelt. Das Vorgestellte als solches ist in Wahrheit Gegenstand des 
sekundären Bewußtseins.” (Hua Dok III/1, p. 84) The presented is object of  the first intention, the presented as such (i.e. 
the presented as presented) is object of  the second intention.
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is acknowledged or rejected, assented or denied), loving or hating (pleasure and displeasure, desiring and wis-
hing away, wanting or fleeing, etc.)  27
Nevertheless, we again see that “inexistence” and even “direction” are actually exceptional ways of  
describing intentionality in Brentano’s lectures, while the standard terminology is rather “relation to 
an immanent object”, sometimes “relation to a content”. But should we really translate and thereby 
interpret “Beziehung” as “relation”? When we consider Brentano’s discussion of  mereology and the 
theory of  relations he never points to intentionality as either a special kind of  relation itself  or as 
falling under one of  the other kinds of  relation. The four kinds of  relations Brentano discusses in 
his logic lectures are: physical (e.g. parts of  a continuum, quantitative parts), metaphysical (e.g. the 
connection among properties, such as quality and intensity), logical (e.g. the way genus and species 
are connected, color and redness) and then the fourth “loose and external” case of  collectives (e.g. a 
herd, an army, a state). None of  these kinds of  relations picks out intentionality as the relation bet-
ween a psychical act and its intentional object. Likewise, correlativity is a feature of  many kinds of  
relations (larger/smaller, master/servant, father/son, etc.) and not specific to intentional acts. So, is 
the intentional “Beziehung” a relation? Brentano tried to be as clear and as unambiguous as possible 
about it: 
1. Everything psychical has an object 
2. This “having-an-object” is not a relation, because it does not involve the existence of  another thing.  28
While the dating of  the manuscript is unclear, it harmonizes perfectly with what we have seen up to 
now. We can think about anything, whether it exists or not. Trivially, if  intentionality were a relation 
in the classical sense, it would have to involve two distinct realities. Hence, obviously, whenever we 
think of  some non-existent thing (centaurs, the golden mountain, etc.), the relation would not ob-
tain. However, then we would not have an act either, since its object and its intentional relation to 
the object would be missing and we cannot have an act without an object. Therefore, since we do 
have acts that have a Beziehung to non-existent objects, intentionality cannot be a relation. For the 
empiricist Brentano, moreover, external perception generally does not show us the world in itself, i.e. 
does not show us substances, but only phenomena.  Consider his answer to Zimmermann in a let29 -
ter from 03-01-1890: 
Is extension the form of  appearance of  something in itself  completely unknown? 
 Brentano EL 80, 13.003: “Von den Grundklassen der psychischen Phänomene 27
1. Alle psychischen Phänomene haben gemeinsam eine Beziehung auf  einen Inhalt. Das ist, was sie von jedem anderen 
unterscheidet. 
2. Diese Beziehung auf  den Inhalt ist eine mehrfache. Nach den Hauptverschiedenheiten lassen sich drei Hauptklassen 
von psychischen Phänomenen unterscheiden Vorstellen (wo immer etwas erscheint), Urteilen (wo immer etwas aner-
kannt oder verworfen, bejaht oder verneint wird), Lieben oder Hassen (Lust und Unlust, Begehren und Wegwünschen, 
Wollen oder Fliehen u.s.f.).”
 Brentano PS 47, 51300: “1. Jedes Psychische hat einen Gegenstand 2. Dies “Gegenstand haben” ist keine Relation, 28
denn es involviert nicht die Existenz von einem andern Dinge.”
 Brentano PS 76, 58002:  “The objects of  perception are called appearances, phenomena”, “Die Gegenstände der 29
Wahrnehmung nennt man Erscheinungen, Phänomene”.
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I answer: no! Provided that one doesn’t link “appearance” with a completely improper meaning. Causing an 
appearance and appearing are two different things, and a lot of  confusion is due to Kant, as he confounded 
and mixed up the one and the other.  30
As we already know from the Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte, Brentano argues that the pur-
ported cause of  the physical phenomena  is an “unpresentable force” in nature (Brentano 1874, p. 
161), and states that “what truly exists, does not appear, and what appears, does not truly 
exist” (Brentano 1874, p. 24). Nature does not appear to us as it is, and what appears to us is at best 
“analogous” to what purportedly exists in nature. Hence, from this standpoint, it makes no sense 
whatsoever to speak of  objects that are at the same time 1) really out there in nature (“an sich”) and 
2) what our intentional acts aim at. External perception is at best putative: it assumes (naively) that 
what you see is what you get.  Intentional existence is as good as it gets. What is real is 1) whom is 31
being appeared to and 2) the appearing itself; not however, what appears.  Indeed, in the manu32 -
script where he clearly distinguishes the “Beziehung” from a relation, Brentano later reformulates this 
point as “the psychical reference is unilaterally real”  In a clarification to his logic lectures, Brentano 33
even explicitly affirms: there are objectless presentations (“es gibt gegenstandslose Vorstellungen”): 
Once again, what do names designate? 
Answer: They designate the objects of  our presentations, etc., but not as objects of  presentation, but as what 
they are presented. 
Objection: What they are presented as, what else is that if  not as an object? And this [would be] impossible 
following our earlier remarks. 
Answer: This is not true in general. Often it is an object, but not always. There is not presentation in which 
there would not exist something intentionally in the mind, but there are objectless presentations. Also some-
thing that is not, even what cannot be at all, can be presented.  34
 “Ist die Ausdehnung Erscheinungsform eines an sich völlig unbekannten? Ich antworte: nein! Vorausgesetzt, dass man 30
mit “Erscheinung” nicht einen ganz uneigentlichen Sinn verbindet. Eine Erscheinung verursachen und selbst erscheinen 
ist zweierlei, und Kant hat viel Verwirrung verschuldet, indem er das eine mit dem anderen verwechselte und vermeng-
te”.
 Brentano PS 76, 58392: “We have a tendency to agree with sense-presentation as presentation of  something real.”, 31
“Wir haben nun eine Neigung der Sinnesvorstellung als Vorstellung von etwas wirklichem zuzustimmen”.
 Brentano, M 97, 31775, compare PS 76, 58723.32
 “Die psychische Beziehung einseitig real”. Brentano PS 47, 51304.33
 Brentano, EL 80, 13016, also see Rollinger 2009b, p. 7 and 17. “Nochmals also was bezeichnen die Namen? 34
Antwort: Sie bezeichnen die Gegenstände unserer Vorstellungen u.s.f., aber nicht als Gegenstände der Vorstellung, son-
dern als das, als was sie Vorgestellt werden. 
Einwand: Das als was es vorgestellt wird, was ist das anders als ein Gegenstand? Und dies unmöglich nach den früheren 
Bemerkungen. 
Antwort: Nicht allgemein ist dies wahr. Oft ist es ein Gegenstand, aber nicht immer. Es gibt keine Vorstellung, bei wel-
cher nicht etwas intentional im Geiste existierte, aber es gibt gegenstandslose Vorstellungen. Auch etwas was nicht ist, ja 
etwas was gar nicht sein kann, kann vorgestellt werden.”
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The point is reiterated in his descriptive psychology lectures from 1887/88: “Every presentation has 
a content of  presentation, but not [every presentation has] an object.”  35
  
Thus we see that Twardowski’s position in his 1894 habilitation work Zum Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegen-
stand der Vorstellungen (“On the Content and Object of  Presentations”) is not just anticipated to a cer-
tain degree by Höfler and Meinong’s 1891 Logik (§ 6, pp. 6-7), but draws directly on Brentano’s lec-
tures. Twardowski argued that there could not be truly “objectless” presentations, echoing Brenta-
no’s dictum: “There is no presenting without [something] presented. There cannot be an empty pre-
senting” (Brentano, Y 2, p. 54). Hence, seemingly empty presentations, to which no external object 
would or could correspond, would still always have an “object” too: a merely intentional object, i.e. a 
non-existent object (Twardowski, 1894, pp. 23 ff.). Then every act would have a content and to every 
content would correspond an object: “What is presented in the presentation, is its content, what is 
presented through the presentation, is its object” (Twardowski, 1894, p. 18). However, as proceeds 
from the quote above, Brentano himself  was already explicitly dealing with the paradox that “all pre-
sentations present something, but not to all presentations corresponds something” in his own way.  
A name designates in a certain way the content of  a presentation as such, the immanent object. 
In a certain way that which is presented through the content of  a presentation. 
The first is the meaning of  the name. 
The second is what the name denominates. Of  this we say that is has that name. If  it exists, it is the external 
object of  the presentation. 
We denominate by way of  the meaning.  36
What can we conclude from all this? 
Sketching a New Approach to Brentano’s Intentionality 
With regard to the classical paradox “all presentations present something, but not to all presentati-
ons corresponds something”, in some sense, Brentano bites the bullet on this one, as he seems to 
make the existence of  the external world hypothetical to such a degree that the second part becomes 
trivially true, and insists so emphatically on the correlativity that makes the first part tautological.  
A better way to resolve this dilemma, might be to take the talk about “perspectives” to the next level, 
i.e. in some sense following Husserl’s eventual development of  phenomenology, but without the 
constitutional idealism. Also in Brentano’s case we can then both distinguish the two perspectives of  
internal and external perception on “the object” and at the same time preach the identity of  the ob-
ject as seen from two perspectives. Following Stumpf ’s psychology lectures, there is but one act and 
 “Jede Vorstellung hat eine Vorstellungsinhalt aber nicht jede ein Gegenstand.” Brentano, PS 76, 58723, where on the 35
same page he also calls such presentations “Gegenstandslos”.
 Brentano EL 80, 13018 “Der Name bezeichnet in gewisser Weise den Inhalt einer Vorstellung als solcher, den imma36 -
nenten Gegenstand. 
In gewisser Weise das, was durch den Inhalt einer Vorstellung vorgestellt wird. 
Der erste ist die Bedeutung des Namens. 
Das zweite ist das, was der Name nennt. Von ihm sagen wir, es komme der Name ihm zu. Es ist das, was, wenn es exis-
tiert, äußerer Gegenstand der Vorstellung ist. 
Man nennt unter Vermittlung der Bedeutung.”
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one object: internal perception is immanent in the act of  e.g. external perception, not a separate act. 
While it too goes on the same object, it does so in a different manner.  37
So the putative external object that we see when we naively follow the “aim” of  our acts is presented 
as transcendent’ly existing (though always with the caveat of  “Wahrnehmung ist Falschnehmung”): physi-
cal phenomena appear as external (“Die physischen haben das gemein, dass sie äußerlich erscheinen” Brentano 
EL 72, 12075) From the perspective of  internal perception this object is revealed as “nothing more” 
than an immanent object with intentional existence, i.e. really existing as a phenomenon. It is an ap-
pearance caused by an object, but not necessarily a veridical appearance of that object.  Only from the 38
perspective of  internal perception the phenomenal character of  our external perceptions is fully re-
vealed. In and with each and every act of  external perception I also have an act of  internal percepti-
on, but not as if  a second act of  observation would go on the first, but intimately united with it, as 
essential part of  it. The object is the same, the only thing that changes is the perspective. Where ex-
ternal perception naively takes its objects as given (misleading us into a relational model), internal 
perception reveals every act as correlational with its object, i.e. every object as immanent, as only real 
in the sense of  being a real phenomenon, not as being a mind-independent reality. 
Hence, we may perhaps consider Brentano’s theory of  intentionality as an incipient and tacit form 
of  transcendentalism (broadly understood), though not, of  course, of  any form of  idealism. It is 
“transcendentalist” (for lack of  a better term) in the deflationary sense that all accounts of  intentio-
nality and of  the phenomenality of  the objects of  our mental acts would be transcendentalist: we 
have no access to objects except as immanent objects that can but have the pretension of  reaching 
something outside of  our acts. There are not two objects, one immanent and one transcendent, but 
merely one object regarded from different perspectives: internal and external perception.   39
Recall the quote from Brentano’s logic lectures that I reported in the beginning: 
Let us consider internal perception, it shows us e.g. presentations - which are real; judging, love, hate - 
all real. But these are not without correlates: no presentation without a presented, no judging without 
a judgment. Indeed, these correlates are what is observed directly in internal perception, while the 
presenting, judging, etc. which are real, are observed indirectly. (Brentano, Y 2, pp. 104 f.) 
Now let me try to clarify the position sketched here with an example following Brentano’s descripti-
on as closely as possible: I look outside and see a red car. In my external perception I have a sensati-
on of  red. In my internal perception I have both the act of  sensation as well as its correlate. Hence, 
we have on the one hand “the color red” (as the object of  external perception) and on the other 
“the color red as object of  external perception” (in internal perception). Now recall furthermore 
Brentano’s lectures on descriptive psychology: “inner experience does not show colors, tones, etc. as 
existing in reality, but rather sensations of  colors etc. and hence it shows them as immanent objects 
 Stumpf  Q11/I, 133 f.: “das innere Bewußtsein … kein selbständiger Akt, es sei nur ein immanenter. … Es muß ja das 37
Bewußtsein in anderer Weise gerichtet sein auf  das äußere Objekt wie auf  das innere. … Es ist e i n e Vorstellung, direkt 
gerichtet auf  das primäre Objekt, indirekt auf  sich selbst”.
 See the quote from Brentano’s letter to Zimmermann of  03-01-1890 above.38
 Mutatis mutandis, these would be similar to the phenomenological and the natural attitudes in later Husserl.39
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of  our sensations: as phenomena.”  Hence, inner perception does show us the objects of  sensation, 40
from its own peculiar perspective, but of  course at the very same time, indeed in the very same act, 
they are also the objects of  the act of  external perception. So the same red color appears simulta-
neously as object of  external perception (with its Falschnehmung as an external reality) and as object 
of  internal perception (with its Wahrnehmung as an internal reality).  
Nevertheless, this stronger role for the perspectives from which we regard the internal structure of  
intentional acts should also accommodate the analyses of  Antonelli and Sauer who sharply distingu-
ish the correlate from the intentional object. 
Brentano object strongly to identifying the “thought object” with the “primary object”: 
The “contemplated horse” considered as object would be the object of  inner perception, which the thinker 
perceives whenever he forms a correlative pair consisting of  this “contemplated horse” along with his thinking 
about the horse; for correlatives are such that one cannot be perceived or apprehended without the other. But 
what are experienced as primary objects, or what are thought universally as primary objects of  reason, are never 
themselves the objects of  inner perception. Had I equated “object” with “object of  thought”, then I would 
have had to say that the primary thought relation has no object or content at all. So I protest against this 
foolishness that has been dreamed up and attributed to me. (Brentano 2009, 53, compare the quotation in Sau-
er 2006, 4) 
Brentano states that “thought horse” is the object of  inner perception, while “horse” is the object 
of  external perception. Yet, whenever I externally perceive a horse, my internal perception will show 
me a correlative unity of  act and object, i.e. in this cases of  a horse-perception and a perceived hor-
se. While the external perception is not directed at a horse as thought, nevertheless from the perspec-
tive of  internal perception we uncover a “thought horse” in it. Without this “thought horse” it 
couldn’t be directed at the transcendent horse (whether or not it exist externally or not). So there is 
just one single object in question here, regarded from two perspectives: as object of  the primary act 
it is the (potentially existing, transcendent) horse, as object of  the secondary act it is the (necessarily 
existing, immanent) thought horse. When Chrudzimski states that “When Hans thinks of  a horse, 
then the horse must immanently inexist in Hans’ mind.” (Chrudzimski 2004, 124) we do have to 
add, obviously, that the “thought horse” is not a horse, just like a  past, future, negated, etc. horse 
would not be a horse. Brentano claims vey correctly that “the presentation of  a horse [does] not 
have “presented horse”, but “horse” as object”, i.e. external perception is directed at unmodified 
existence. Internal perception, however, perceives the real mental act without modification (a pre-
sent, individual, etc.), and the correlative intentional object as modified, namely as thought. Internal 
perception cannot ever see horses simpliciter, but only presented, remembered, phantasized, etc. hor-
ses, i.e. modified horses. However, it could never do so if  there were not a primary act that presents 
objects without modification. The alternative to regarding the unmodified and modified object as 
one and the same, though regarded from two perspectives, is to stipulate, besides the potential ex-
ternal object, two more objects internally. Indeed, Brentano clarifies that: 
I have always held (in agreement with Aristotle) that “horse” and not “contemplated horse” is the immanent 
object of  those thoughts that pertain to horses. Naturally, however, I did say that “horse” is thought or con-
templated by us, and that insofar as we do think of  it (N.B., insofar as we think of  the horse and not of  the 
“contemplated horse”) we have “horse” as (immanent) object. (Brentano 2009, 53) 
 Brentano, PS 76 58012-58013. “Die innere Erfahrung zeigt uns nicht  Farben, nicht Töne, usw. als in Wirklichkeit 40
bestehende: Sie zeigt uns aber eine Empfindung von Farben usw. und somit diese als immanente Gegenstände unserer 
Empfindungen: als Phänomene.”
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As should be clear by now, the (in)famous intentionality quote from the Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint is not only insufficient, but even misleading regarding Brentano’s theory of  intentionality. 
Like the proponents of  the ontological interpretation as well as their critics, in this article I too saw 
the need to go beyond this single source in order to uncover Brentano’s meaning. Unfortunately, in 
many cases we do not as of  yet have a reliable critical edition of  the relevant manuscripts.  Howe41 -
ver, while the various passages I quoted come from a wide variety of  contexts, they do add up to a 
coherent position. One central implication of  the interpretation I am advocating would be that, what 
names refer to (“denominate”) are not immanent objects as such, i.e. as immanent, merely presented 
object (i.e. objects of  internal perception), but the immanent objects as transcendent objects, as if 
they existed transcendent’ly (i.e. intentional objects). 
The latter claim would then be in line with my transcendentalist interpretation. In the case of  e.g. 
external perception, we cannot make any claims at all about any existence beyond the appearances: 
“what truly exists, does not appear, and what appears, does not truly exist” (Brentano 1874, 24). All 
claims of  external perception and of  the sciences based upon it are putative, presumptive, pretensi-
on. External perception does (mistakenly) show us the contents of  sensation as properties of  ob-
jects existing in reality, while internal perception (correctly) shows them as immanent objects, as 
phenomena. Indeed, the object is intimately “fused” with the act (Brentano 1874, p. 170). In one act 
with one object, I am also reflectively aware of  the act and its correlate. The  act of  external percep-
tion misleads me into thinking this red actually is an external reality (property of  a real external ob-
ject, accident of  a substance, etc.). Reflection shows me that it is not. In reflection the correlate of  
the act is revealed to me as an immanent object, as phenomenon. So at the same time, the same ob-
ject of  sensation is regarded as existing externally and internally, as existing as an external reality and 
as existing only as an internal reality. From the critical, reflective standpoint of  internal perception, 
when we name the color of  the rose “red”, we name the (putative) external object by way of  the 
immanent content (which, as such, we know is really existing as phenomenon), while being aware of  
the presumption implicit in the act. We cannot name the inaccessible “unpresentable force in natu-
re” and we distinguish the immanent and transcendent object, i.e. we distinguish meaning and refe-
rence and name the latter by way of  the former. Hence, what is naively accepted by external percep-
tion, is revealed in its ambiguous nature by internal perception. This is exactly the inherently trans-
cendental function of  intentionality: that its reach exceeds its grasp. In the vast majority of  the 
cases,  including external perception, we only have access to the intended objects through signs, i.e. 42
through improper presentations: “We improperly present that of  which we have no precisely corre-
sponding presentation and often can have none.” (Brentano, EL 80/13060, translation from Rollin-
ger 2009a, pp. 81 f.) 
In the Psychologie Brentano had already pointed out 1) that external perception actually isn’t really a 
case of  veridical perception (Brentano, 1874, p. 120; 1995, p. 70), 2) external perception is exactly 
like a dream, “without reality that would correspond to them” (Brentano, 1874, pp. 230 f.; 1995, p. 
136), 3) physical phenomena are “signs of  something real”, which does not appear itself. Hence, all 
extra-mental reality is only accessible through symbolic presentations (Ierna 2012). This position is 
reasserted also in his lectures on descriptive psychology: 
 On the reasons for this predicament, also see Schuhmann 2004, p.  277.41
 Including God, higher numbers, and other minds, see Brentano EL 72 242-243.42
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17/10 
Is the burning of  the lamp immediately certain? Only through inferences can we assume such, the appearance 
[Schein] itself  that I have, does not justify it. Our appearance is only a sign [Unser Schein ist nur ein Zeichen], that is 
not yet that outer [thing] (Brentano Q 10) 
Not only do the causes of  our sensations not appear, they are to all effects “unpresentable”: Brenta-
no speaks of  an “unvorstellbare Kraft” (Brentano, 1874, p. 161; 1995, p. 94). Therefore the claim that 
“Der intentionale bzw. immanente Gegenstand des Denkens ist nicht das gedachte, sondern das 
wirkliche A.” (Antonelli 2000, p. 107) cannot be straightforwardly true. The “unpresentable force in 
nature” cannot be an “intentional object”, the phenomenon cannot be identical with its cause. This 
is more extensively discussed in his lectures on “Selected Questions from Psychology and Aesthe-
tics”: 
[Inner perception] shows us psychical phenomena, e.g. a judgment, a will, etc. 
And all of  these share the reference to an immanent object, e.g. desiring to a desired, denial to a denied, etc. 
The desired as desired is in the desirer. 
Although we, when we perceive our desiring, acknowledge the immanent existence of  the desired as desired, 
we would not say that we perceive the desired as such, but only that we perceive our desiring, whose correlate it 
is. This correlate is simply not real. (as little as a past, hoped reality [would be] a reality)  (Brentano PS 78, 43
59568-59569) 
Brentano then proceeds to repeat the external perception isn’t perception in the proper sense of  the 
word, and neither are its putative “objects” actually objects in the same sense as the objects of  inter-
nal perception. We cannot distinguish between external perception and hallucination, so we never 
have immediate evidence of  the external world. He again repeats his position of  the Psychologie that 
physical phenomena are signs (Brentano PS 78, 59576) for their cause, which is unknown, which is 
not the object of  the presentation (Brentano PS 78, 59577: “kein wirklicher eigentlicher Gegenstand der 
Äußeren Wahrnehmungsvorstellung … sondern nur eine Ursache der Vorstellung, ein in sich unbekanntes”). 
Now one might suppose that the position of  Antonelli and Sauer would at least work for sensations, 
which Brentano defined as “fundamental presentations of  real physical phenomena” (Brentano PS 
76, 58187, “eine fundamentale Vorstellung von realen physischen Phänomenen”), so of  non-psychical, non-
modified (no negations, inactuals, etc.), and non-superimposed (no general, unintuitive, contradicto-
ry, etc.). However, even this is highly debatable, since Brentano claims very explicitly that e.g. in the 
case of  color, there can be no unperceived color, it can only exist in the perception as immanent ob-
ject, as phenomenon (“Da die Farbe nur als Phänomen besteht, so ist es klar, dass es keine Farbe gibt, die nicht 
wahrgenommen wird” Brentano EL 72, 12072). This seems generalisable to all other sensations as well. 
Sensations always have quality, intensity, and spatial localisation (Brentano PS 76, 58202) and we 
have the tendency to project the sensed qualities onto their causes, i.e. onto the putative external ob-
jects, as if  they were their properties (Brentano PS 76, 58360-58361): 
 “[Die innere Wahrnehmung] zeigt uns psychische Phänomene z.B. ein Urteil, ein Wollen, und dergleichen.  43
Und diesen allen ist […] gemeinsam die Beziehung auf  ein immanentes Object, z.B. Begehren auf  ein Begehrtes, Ver-
neinung auf  ein Geleugnetes, und dergleichen. Das Begehrte als Begehrtes ist in dem Begehrenden. 
Obwohl wir nun, indem wir unser Begehren wahrnehmen, die immanente Existenz des Begehrten als Begehrten erken-
nen, so werden wir doch nicht wohl sagen dass wir das Begehrte als solches wahrnehmen, sondern nur das wir unser 
Begehren wahrnehmen, dessen Correlat es ist. Dieses Correlat ist eben nicht real. (so wenig wie eine gewesene, gehoffte 
Realität eine Realität).”
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Even when we have been better informed by science, we cannot free ourselves from the impulse to the illusion 
and detach the subjective quality of  sensation from the presented object again.  (Brentano PS 76, 58361) 44
Thus the transcendent object, an external reality, never becomes part of  any intentional act, it is 
neither one of  the relata (since intentionality isn’t a relation anyway), nor is it one of  the correlates. 
Hence it is neither the intended nor the intentional object. What is the intended and intentional ob-
ject, and is revealed as such and as correlate in reflection, is always only the immanent object. “Ob-
ject” isn’t even properly applicable to the “unpresentable force in nature”. The act is the only thing 
that is both real and existing, while the object (the only object in the proper sense) always exists, but 
is not transcendent’ly real: it is a phenomenon. The external “object” only enters the equation as the 
putative correspondent, not of  any act, but of  the semantical sign, as denotatum (see Ierna 2012 for a 
more extensive discussion on Brentano and semiotics).  Such acts are of  course improper, symboli45 -
cal, and their objects, can be considered from two standpoints. First-intentionally, we fall prey to the 
naive assumption of  their reality, second-intentionally, we see them for what they really are, i.e. as 
phenomena. In internal perception we also see the semantic character, the sign-character of  the in-
tentional object and hence its transcendent reference, its nature of  a surrogate. For instance, a sensa-
tion of  red is symbolic insofar as it acts merely as a sign in a symbolic presentation of  its stimulus. If  
I take the sensation of  red as a sign for something else, then it does not have as content what its 
name means, but refers beyond itself, symbolically. We properly present the signs, and improperly 
present through the signs.  46
This perspectival account also solves the problem of  properly and improperly distinctional parts of  
mental acts. The correlates are proper parts of  the act, but what the intentional object transcendent’-
ly refers to is only improperly part of  the act. That is to say, single sensations together form a whole 
which presumptively lies beyond them. We properly intend each of  the single features, but not the 
whole, which is presented symbolically. The external object putatively presented through it cannot 
be said to be part of  the act. The unpresentable force in nature certainly cannot be properly inten-
ded, but only per accidens.   47
All our transcendent’ly directed acts have this structure of  improper intentions of  ambiguous ob-
jects. 
 “Selbst wenn wir durch die Wissenschaft etwas besser belehrt sind, können wir uns nicht von dem Drange zu der 44
Illusion emancipieren und die subjective Empfindungsqualität von dem vorgestellten Object wieder loslösen.”
 In EL 80 he claimed that the external object is what is named, while the internal is the meaning, and we “denominate 45
by way of  the meaning”. In EL 74, the Psychognostic Sketch, 12787, he then says that names are closely connected to surro-
gate presentations, i.e. symbolic, improper presentations, and that we “denominate by way of  the surrogate presentati-
ons”.
 Compare Höfler and Meinong 1890, p. 7.46
 Brentano gives the classical example of  “seeing” the son of  Diares, who is actually only seen per accidens. It is not a real 47
perception, but only an αἴσθησις κατὰ συμβεβηκός. See Brentano, PS 78, 59574 ff.
Carlo Ierna “Improper Intentions of  ambiguous objects” Final accepted draft -    17
Bibliography 
Albertazzi, Liliana; Libardi, Massimo; Poli, Roberto (1996), The School of  Franz Brentano Dordrecht: 
Kluwer.  
Antonelli, Mauro (2000), “Franz Brentano und die Wiederentdeckung der Intentionalität. Richtig-
stellung herkömmlicher Missverständnisse und Missdeutungen.” in Grazer Philosophische Studien 58-59: 
93-117. 
Brentano, Franz (1874), Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 
Brentano, Franz (1995), Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, edited by Linda L. McAlister, London: 
Routledge. 
Brentano, Franz (2009), The True and the Evident, tr. Roderick Chisholm, London: Routledge. 
Chisholm, Roderick (1967) “Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional”, in E.N. Lee, 
M.H. Mandelbaum (eds.). Phenomenology and Existentialism, Baltimore: Hopkins Press. 
Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz (2004), Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos, Phaenomenologica 172, Dordrecht/
Boston/London: Springer. 
Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz (2007), Gegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong, Pha-
enomenologica 181, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Springer. 
Höfler, Alois and Meinong,  Alexius (1890), Philosophische Propädeutik. Erster Theil: Logik, Vienna: F. 
Tempsky / G. Freytag. 
Edmund Husserl (1994), Edmund Husserl. Briefwechsel, edited by Karl Schuhmann and Elisabeth 
Schuhmann, Husserliana Dokumente III, Dordrecht: Springer. 
Ierna, Carlo (2012), “Brentano and the Theory of  Signs” in Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica, n. 2: 
11-22. 
Ierna, Carlo (2014), “La science de la conscience selon Brentano”, in Vers une philosophie scientifique. Le 
programme de Brentano, edited by Charles-Edouard Niveleau, Paris: Démopolis, pp. 51-69. 
Rollinger, Robin (2009a), “Brentano’s Logic and Marty’s Early Philosophy of  Language” in Brentano 
Studien XII: 77-98. 
Rollinger, Robin (2009b), “Brentano’s Psychology and Logic and the Basis of  Twardowski’s Theory 
of  Presentations” in The Baltic International Yearbook of  Cognition, Logic and Communication, Volume 4 
200 Years of  Analytical Philosophy: 1-23. 
Sauer, Werner (2006), “Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano”, in Grazer Philoso-
phische Studien 73: 1–26. 
Carlo Ierna “Improper Intentions of  ambiguous objects” Final accepted draft -    18
Schuhmann, Karl (2004) “Brentano’s impact on twentieth-century philosophy” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Brentano, edited by Dale Jacquette, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, David Woodruff, and McIntyre, Ronald (1982), Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of  Mind, 
Meaning, and Language, Dordrecht: Reidel. 
Twardowski, Kasimir (1894), Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine psychologische 
Untersuchung, Vienna: Hölder. 
Manuscripts 
From the Husserl-Archives Leuven: 
Brentano, Franz (1884/85), Y 2: Die elementare Logik und die in ihr nötigen Reformen I.  (Notes by Eduard 
Leisching kept at the Husserl-Archives Leuven). 
Brentano, Franz (1887/88), Q 10: Descriptive Psychologie. (Notes from Hans Schmidkunz, copied by 
Malvine Husserl, kept at the Husserl-Archives Leuven). 
Stumpf, Carl (1886/87), Q 11/I: Vorlesungen über Psychologie. (Notes by Husserl, transcription by Eli-
sabeth Schuhmann & Karl Schuhmann, based on a partial transcription by Robin Rollinger). 
From the Houghton Library, Harvard University,  Franz Clemens Brentano Compositions, 
1870-1917 (MS Ger 230): 
Brentano, Franz, EL 72: Die elementare Logik und die in ihr nötigen Reformen. 
Brentano, Franz, EL 80: Logik. (An on-line edition by Robin Rollinger is available at http://gams.u-
ni-graz.at/o:bag.el.80-html-norm N.B. hitherto considered to be from the “late 1880s”, in this new 
edition this manuscript is now considered to be much older instead, originally stemming from 
1869/70, with continuous revisions up to and beyond 1877). 
Brentano, Franz, M 97: Vorlesung Ueber Metaphysik. 1882/1883. 
Brentano, Franz, PS 47: Bewusstsein. Elementares Zur Deskriptiven Psychologie.  
Brentano, Franz, PS 76: Deskriptive Psychologie. Kolleg 1887/1888. 
Brentano, Franz, PS 78: Ausgewählte Fragen aus der Psychologie und Aesthetik. Wien, WS 1885/86 
From the Houghton Library, Harvard University,  Franz Clemens Brentano Correspon-
dence, 1870-1917 (MS Ger 202): 
Brentano, Franz, to Zimmermann, Robert, 3 jan 1890, number 1717.
